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Abstract We discuss combined effects of stochasticity and time delays in finite-population
three-player games with two mixed Nash equilibria and a pure one. We show that if basins of
attraction of the stable interior equilibrium and the stable pure one are equal, then an arbitrary
small time delay makes the pure one stochastically stable. Moreover, if the basin of attraction
of the interior equilibrium is bigger than the one of the pure equilibrium, then there exists a
critical time delay where the pure equilibrium becomes stochastically stable.
Keywords Evolutionary game theory · Three-player games · Time delay ·
Stochastic stability
1 Introduction
Many social and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals
within the framework of evolutionary game theory [5,16,23,25,28,33,38,39]. Although in
many models the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually
decomposed into a sum of two-player games. However, truly multi-player games naturally
appear in many situations. For example, Haigh and Canning [15] discussed a multi-player
War of Attrition, Pacheco et al. [30] analyzed a multi-player Stag Hunt game, and Souza et al.
[35] and Santos et al. [34] discussed a multi-player Snowdrift game. There have also appeared
J. Mie¸kisz (B) · J. Poleszczuk
Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw,





Department of Discrete Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science,
University of Adam Mickiewicz, Umultowska 87, 61-614 Poznan, Poland
e-mail: gruby@mat.umk.pl
490 Dyn Games Appl (2014) 4:489–498
some systematic studies of multi-player games. Broom et al. [2] defined evolutionarily stable
strategies for multi-player games and analyzed their properties, Kim [21] investigated an
asymptotic and stochastic stability of Nash equilibria in multi-player games, Bukowski and
Mie¸kisz [3] provided a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies,
and fixation probabilities were discussed by Gokhale and Traulsen [10], see also [11,12].
For certain payoff parameters, such games may have multiple mixed Nash equilibria. For
example, in one class of three-player games (discussed here), we have one pure and two
mixed Nash equilibria. We are faced with a standard problem of equilibrium selection. We
will approach this problem from a dynamical point of view. Let us remark that such a situation
may also arise in two-player games in the case where payoff functions are not linear in the
population state [33].
It is usually assumed that interactions between individuals take place instantaneously and
their effects are immediate. In reality, all social and biological processes take a certain amount
of time. It is natural, therefore, to introduce time delays into evolutionary games. It is well
known that time delays may cause oscillations in solutions of ordinary differential equations
[6,7,13,14,22]. Effects of time delay in evolutionary games were discussed in [1,17,18,27,
29,36,37]. It was shown there that for certain models and time delays (above a critical value
where the Hopf bifurcation appears), evolutionary dynamics exhibits oscillations and cycles,
and interior equilibria ceased to be asymptotically stable in discrete and continuous replicator
dynamics. In particular, Moreira et al. [27] discussed multi-player Stag Hunt game with time
delays.
Replicator dynamics describe time evolution of frequencies of strategies in the limit of
an infinite number of individuals. However real populations are finite. Stochastic effects
connected with random matching of players, mistakes of players, and biological mutations
can play a significant role in such systems. Therefore, to describe and analyze their time
evolution, one should use stochastic modeling.
For symmetric games with two strategies, a state of the population is given by the number
of individuals playing, say, the first strategy. The selection part of the dynamics ensures that
if the average payoff of a given strategy is bigger than the average payoff of the other one,
then the number of individuals playing the given strategy increases. In the model introduced
by Kandori et al. [20], one assumes (as in the standard replicator dynamics) that individuals
receive average payoffs weighted by fractions of different strategies present in the population.
Players may mutate with a small probability, hence the population may move against a
selection pressure. To describe the long-run behavior of such stochastic dynamics, Foster
and Young [8] introduced a concept of stochastic stability.
Here we will study how time delays affect stochastic stability of Nash equilibria of evo-
lutionary games. In [27], the authors show that if the time delay is sufficiently large, the
oscillations become so big that the population may leave the basin of attraction of the inte-
rior evolutionarily stable strategy and converges to the homogeneous state. In our paper we
show that one does not need big time delays to make a pure evolutionarily stable strategy
stochastically stable. In particular, we will show that if basins of attraction of both Nash
equilibria are equal, then an arbitrary small time delay makes the pure one stochastically
stable. Moreover, if the basin of attraction of the interior equilibrium is bigger than the one
of the pure ones, then there exists a critical time delay where the pure equilibrium becomes
stochastically stable.
In Sect. 2, we discuss the simple stochastic dynamics of a three-player game with two
interior Nash equilibria. In Sect. 3, we present results concerning stochastic stability in the
presence of time delays. Discussion follows in Sect. 4.
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Fig. 1 a Stability of stationary points in three-player replicator dynamics with two mixed Nash equilibria,
b stability of stationary points in Example 1, c stability of stationary points in Example 2
2 Stochastic Evolutionary Models in Finite Populations
We consider symmetric three-player games with two strategies, A and B, given by the fol-
lowing payoff matrices:
U =
A B A B
A a 0 0 0
B 0 b b c
where the left matrix gives payoffs for the row player, when the third player uses A, whereas
the right matrix provides payoffs in the case of the third individual playing B.
In the well-mixed infinite populations, the expected values (with respect to the fraction of
strategies in the population) of the payoffs of strategies are given by
f A = ax2, fB = 2bx(1 − x) + c(1 − x)2, (2.1)
where x is the frequency of players with the A strategy. Mixed Nash equilibria are given by
solutions of the equation f A = fB . The standard replicator dynamics reads [16,39]
dx
dt
= x(1 − x)( f A − fB). (2.2)
The classification of three-player games with respect to the number of Nash equilibria
and evolutionarily stable strategies was provided in [3]. Here we consider games with three
Nash equilibria: two mixed ones (an asymptotically stable x1 and an unstable x2) and an
asymptotically stable pure one, x3 = 1, as it is illustrated in a phase portrait of the replicator





To study the effects of stochastic perturbations on the stability of Nash equilibria we will
deal with finite-population models. Namely, let us assume that our population consists of N
individuals. The state of the population at any discrete time t is characterized by the number
of individuals, z(t), playing the strategy A. Now to avoid unnecessary (and non-essential)
technicalities, we will choose N and payoffs such that the Nash equilibria are given by
natural numbers and are equal to Nash equilibria in infinite populations. It means that we
allow self-interactions, that is x = z/N in (2.1).






zt + 1 if f A(zt ) > fB(zt ),
zt − 1 if f A(zt ) < fB(zt ),
zt if f A(zt ) = fB(zt ),
(2.3)
with the probability 1 −  and with the probability  the population moves in the other
direction in the first two cases; if f A(zt ) = fB(zt ), then the number of A-strategists stays
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the same with the probability 1 −  and decreases or increases by one at time t + 1 with the
probability /2; if zt = 0, then zt+1 = 0 with the probability 1 −  and with the probability
, zt+1 = 1; if zt = N , then zt+1 = N with the probability 1 −  and with the probability ,
zt+1 = N − 1.
We have obtained an ergodic Markov chain with the unique stationary probability
distribution—stationary state μ . It is easy to see that there are four absorbing states of
our dynamics with  = 0: two interior states, z1 and z2, with coexisting strategies; and two
homogeneous ones, z3 = N and z = 0, the last one is not a Nash equilibrium. Now the
question is which absorbing states survive small stochastic perturbations; that is, which are
in the support of the zero- limit of μ . The following concept of stochastic stability was
introduced in [8].
Definition A subset of states Y of a Markov chain with the unique stationary probability
distribution μ is stochastically stable if
lim
→0 μ(Y ) = 1.
It means that along almost any trajectory, for a small mutation level , the frequency of
visiting Y is close to 1.
It is clear that in our models the only candidates for stochastically stable states are the
asymptotically stable (for  = 0) absorbing states z1 and z3. We may also intuitively expect
that if the number of steps (mutations or mistakes which happen with the probability ) to
get out of the basin of attraction of a given state is bigger than the number of steps to get out
of the basin of attraction of the other state, then the given state is stochastically stable. The
formal proof uses the tree lemma—the special representation of a stationary distribution of
an ergodic Markov chain [9], see (4.2) in the Appendix. We get the following theorem.
Theorem 1 z1 is stochastically stable if and only if 3
√
(b2 + ac) < a + b.
In our paper we discuss two particular examples.
Example 1 We choose a = 12, b = 15, c = −12, then x1 = 1/3 and x2 = 2/3 are two
mixed Nash equilibria. We set N = 30, hence z1 = 10 and z2 = 20, see Fig. 1b.
Proposition 1
lim




Proof For every state there is only one rooted tree. In particular, it follows from the fact that
z2 − z1 = N − z2 that trees rooted at z1 and z3 have the same product of probabilities (the
system needs the same number of mutations to get out of basins of attraction of both states.
The proposition follows from the tree lemma. unionsq
Example 2 Here a = 8, b = 13, c = −11, then x1 = 1/3 and x2 = 22/30. We set N = 30,
hence z1 = 10 and z2 = 22, see Fig. 1c.
Proposition 2 z1 is stochastically stable.
Proof Now we have that z2 − z1 > N − z2. In particular, the tree rooted at z1 has the leading
term of the order 12 and that of z3 has the order 8. In other words, one needs 12 mistakes
to get out of the basin of attraction of x1 and 8 mistakes to get out of the basin of attraction
of x3. unionsq
Let us mention that three-player games with random matching of players [24,32] were
analyzed in [19]. Dependence of stochastic stability of equilibria on game parameters (pay-
offs) is much more complex there.
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3 Stochastic Models with Time Delays






zt + 1 if f A(zt−τ ) > fB(zt−τ ),
zt − 1 if f A(zt−τ ) < fB(zt−τ ),
zt if f A(zt−τ ) = fB(zt−τ ),
(3.1)
with the probability 1 −  and with the probability  the population moves in the other
direction in the first two cases; if f A(zt−τ ) = fB(zt−τ ), then the number of A-strategists
decreases or increases by one at time t + 1 with the probability /2; if zt = 0 or N , then
zt+1 = zt with the probability  and with the probability 1 −  the system moves toward the
interior.
Let us note that because of the time delay, we have to specify initial conditions for all
discrete moments of time −τ ≤ t ≤ 0. To restore the Markov property of our dynamics,
we redefine states of our our system to be τ + 1 tuples (zt−τ , zt−τ+1, . . . , zt ) at time t . In
that way we get a Markov chain with the unique stationary probability distribution. Similar
dynamical models with transition probabilities depending upon the finite history are known
as high-order Markov chains [4,31]. By the stochastic stability of a cycle we mean that the
set consisting of τ τ + 1 tuples appearing in the cycle is stochastically stable.
Let us assume that τ < z2 − z1. It is easy to see the cycle around z1 with the amplitude
τ and the time period 4τ + 2 is a trajectory of the deterministic part of the dynamics (3.1)
that is it is invariant under the deterministic rule (3.1). Moreover, it was proven in [26] that
when we start with any consistent initial condition (z0, z−1, . . . , z−τ ), that is |zt − zt−1| ≤ 1,
t = 0, . . . ,−τ + 1 and here we additionally assume that z0, z−1, . . . , z−τ < z2 with not all
zs equal to 0, we end up in the cycle in a finite time. It was also proven in [26] that the cycle
is stochastically stable.
Now let us observe that once we have oscillations around z1, it is easier to escape the
basin of attraction of the cycle. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 z3 = N is stochastically stable if and only if z2 − z1 < N − z2 + τ .
Proof To leave the basin of attraction of z1 we allow the system to move along the cycle until
it reaches the state z1 +τ . Then we need z2 − z1 −τ mutations to reach z2 and then n(τ ) < τ
mutations to arrive at the state z2 + n(τ ), then the population will converge to z3 = N by the
deterministic dynamics ( = 0). It is easy to see that n(1) = 1, n(2) = 1, n(3) = 2, n(4) =
2, n(5) = 2, and n(6) = 3. To move out of z3 and to arrive at the cycle of z1 one needs
N − z2 + n(τ ). The theorem follows from the tree lemma, see (4.2) in the Appendix. unionsq
In particular, we have the following propositions:
Proposition 3 In Example 1, z3 = N is stochastically stable for any time delay τ ≥ 1.
Proposition 4 In Example 2, z3 = N is stochastically stable for any time delay τ ≥ 5.
Let us note that the definition of stochastic stability involves two limits. For any fixed but
low  we take the limit of t → ∞ to get the stationary probability distribution and then we
take the limit  → 0. It is clear that for a very low , if we start with initial conditions close
to a non-stochastically stable absorbing state (or cycle) we might need a very long time to
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Fig. 2 Trajectories of stochastic dynamics in Example 1,  = 0.05, initial conditions z(t) = 11,−τ ≤ t ≤ 0,
a τ = 1, b τ = 1, beginning of a trajectory, c τ = 1, a trajectory after a switch, d τ = 3, e τ = 5, f τ = 7, g
τ = 9
arrive near a stochastically stable state (one needs many mistakes and each of them has the
probability ). Results of stochastic simulations for both examples with initial conditions
z(−τ) = · · · = z(0) = z1 + 1 and various time delays are presented in Figs. 2 and 3.
We expect that bigger the time delay, smaller is the time the population needs to arrive in
the neighborhood of the stochastically stable state z3. However, we observe that individual
trajectories might not behave that way, see Fig. 2a, d, where the switching time is smaller for
τ = 1 than for τ = 3. What should be true is that the average switching time should decrease
as the time delay increases. The average switching times (with respect to 1800 simulations)
are presented in Fig. 4 and support this statement. Standard deviations of switching times are
of the order of averages.
4 Discussion
We discussed finite fixed-size populations with a simple stochastic dynamics. More precisely,
we studied three-player games with two interior stationary points (mixed Nash equilibria,
one asymptotically stable and one unstable in the deterministic discrete replicator dynamics)
Dyn Games Appl (2014) 4:489–498 495
Fig. 3 Trajectories of stochastic dynamics in Example 2,  = 0.05, initial conditions z(t) = 11,−τ ≤ t ≤ 0
a τ = 5, b τ = 5, beginning of a trajectory, c τ = 6, d τ = 6, beginning of a trajectory, e τ = 6, a trajectory
after a switch, f τ = 7, g τ = 8
Fig. 4 Average switching times
for various τ and , initial
conditions
z(t) = 11,−τ ≤ t ≤ 0
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with coexisting strategies and a stable homogeneous stationary point (pure Nash equilib-
rium). We showed that if basins of attraction of the stable interior equilibrium and the stable
homogeneous one are equal, then an arbitrary small time delay makes the homogeneous one
stochastically stable. The reason is that in the presence of a time delay, the interior equilibrium
loses its stability—there appears an asymptotically stable cycle—and then it is easier to get
out of its basin of attraction by stochastic perturbations. Moreover, if the basin of attraction
of the interior equilibrium is bigger than that of the homogeneous one, then there exists a
critical time delay where the homogeneous equilibrium becomes stochastically stable.
We would like to emphasize that global stability of the homogeneous equilibrium in our
model is a combined effect of both stochasticity and time delays. In the absence of a time
delay, the interior equilibrium is stochastically stable, while in the absence of stochastic per-
turbations, both the homogeneous equilibrium and the cycle around the interior equilibrium
are locally asymptotically stable.
Multi-player Stag Hunt game with time delays was recently analyzed in [27]. However,
cooperation strategy was not a Nash equilibrium there. The authors concluded that results
of their model with time delays reinforced a traditional message that defection is evolution-
arily advantageous. In stochastic version of their model we obtain stochastic stability of the
defection strategy.
It is important to study effects of time delays and stochasticity in more complex evolu-
tionary systems. In particular, we would like to construct an evolutionary model of social
dilemma with stochastic stability of the cooperation strategy. The work is in progress.
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Appendix: Stationary Probability Distributions of Ergodic Markov Chains
The following tree representation of a unique stationary probability distribution of an ergodic
Markov chain was proposed in [9].
Let (, P) be an ergodic Markov chain with a state space  and transition probabilities
given by P :  ×  → [0, 1]. It has the unique stationary probability distribution μ . For
x ∈ , an x-tree is a directed graph on  (connecting all vertices) such that from every
y = x there is a unique path to x and there are no outcoming edges out of x . Denote by T (x)







where P(y, y′) is the element of the transition matrix (that is, a conditional probability that
the system will be at the state y′ at time t +1 provided it was at state y at time t) and the above
product is with respect to all edges of the x−tree d . Here in our paper we assumed that the
system follows some deterministic rule with the probability 1 −  and with the probability
, a mistake is made that moves the system in the other direction hence P(y, y′) is equal
either to 1 − , , or 0. Now one can show that (the tree lemma)




for all x ∈ .
It follows from that the stationary probability distribution can be written as the ratio of
two polynomials in . Hence any non-absorbing state (for  = 0) has zero probability in the
stationary distribution in the zero- limit. Moreover, in order to study the zero- limit of the
stationary distribution, it is enough to consider paths between absorbing states. Assume for
example, like in our models, that we have two absorbing states (sets): x and y. Let mxy be a
minimal number of mutations (mistakes) needed to make a transition from the state x to y
and myx the minimal number of mutations to make a transition from y to x . Then q(x) is
of the order myx and q(y) is of the order mxy . If for example myx < mxy , then it follows
that lim→0 μ(x) = 1, hence x is stochastically stable.
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